报告题目：Two tigers in One Mountain: Are there Implicit Collusions in the  Corn Seed Market?

时间：2023年12月5日，上午10点，中关村主楼317

报告人：美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校 施冠明（Guanming Shi）教授

报告人简介：施冠明（Guanming Shi），美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校教授，博士生导师，农业和应用经济系主任。本科毕业于复旦大学国际金融系，2005年在UC Berkeley获得博士学位，同年加入 University of Wisconsin-Madison历任助理教授，副教授，教授，并长期担任系研究生招生委员会及研究生项目委员会主任，以及学院学校各类学术委员会成员。她的研究成果发表于欧美各主要农业和应用经济学学术期刊，如American Journal of Agricultural Economics （AJAE）, Nature Biotechnology, Agricultural Economics等国际知名期刊。她被业界誉为其领域内“最具潜力年轻教授”， 承担多项美国农业部USDA研究课题，并曾担任美国自然科学基金NSF评审，及多家学术期刊评审如AJAE, Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, China Economic Review, Ecological Economics等。

报告内容简介：

In a market dominated by a few leading firms, firms can implicitly divide the market and offer different products from their rivals to avoid direct competition. Such implicit collusion can increase firms’ market power to obtain additional profits. We show the difference in the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of implicit collusion between duopoly and those among oligopoly. Using U.S. corn seed market as a case study, we examine whether there is evidence of implicit collusion in setting prices and/or product lines. Results indicate that there is significant collusion in not only price setting stage, but also product line choosing stage. However, the implicit collusion is not symmetric.

（承办：应用经济系、科研与学术交流中心）