题目： Retailer Information Sharing with Supplier Encroachment

主讲人： 关旭

时间：2017年12月14日下午14:30

地点：主楼317室

主讲人介绍：

        武汉大学经济与澳门永利唯一官网304管理科学与工程系教授，管理学博士。目前研究兴趣包括信息不对称环境下的供应链管理及收益管理。近5年来在Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistics, Decision Support System, Omega, Transportation Research Part E, International Journal of Production Economics, Annals of Operations Research, International Journal of Production Research发表10余篇论文。

内容介绍：

        This paper investigates a retailer's incentive for sharing private demand information with a supplier who may encroach the retail channel by imposing a fixed entry cost. Although conventional wisdom suggests that a retailer should withhold her private demand observations to maintain an information advantage over the supplier, we obtain a different conclusion by demonstrating that the retailer may prefer to voluntarily share the demand information in anticipation of supplier encroachment. The intuition is that in face of the threat of supplier encroachment, sharing low demand information may prevent the supplier from establishing a direct selling channel, which will reduce downstream channel competition. This strategic effect of information sharing is new and only becomes dominant when there is an intermediate entry cost for encroachment and a high channel substitution rate. In contrast, when there are deviations from these conditions, the supplier's equilibrium encroachment decision is consistent and irrespective of the retailer's decision to share information, which makes withholding the demand information more beneficial to the retailer. The change of information sharing structure in the channel also leads to some unintended payoff implications, as the supplier's and channel's payoffs exhibit non-monotonic relations to the entry cost or channel substitution rate.

 （承办：技术经济及管理系，科研与学术交流中心）